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Abstract—Low-latency communication is crucial to sat-
isfy the strict requirements on latency and reliability in
5G communications. In this paper, we ﬁrstly consider a
contract-based vehicular fog computing resource allocation
framework to minimize the intolerable delay caused by the
numerous tasks on the base station during peak time. In the
vehicular fog computing framework, the users tend to select
nearby vehicles to process their heavy tasks to minimize
delay, which relies on the participation of vehicles. Thus,
it is critical to design an effective incentive mechanism
to encourage vehicles to participate in resource allocation.
Next, the simulation results demonstrate that the contract-
based resource allocation can achieve better performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Low-latency communication is crucial for diverse
emerging 5G applications such as self driving, collision
warning, and environment monitoring [1], [2]. The huge
amount of data trafﬁc caused by these applications poses
a great challenge on the base station (BS) during peak
time, which cannot guarantee the stringent quality of
service (QoS) on low-latency and quality of experience
(QoE) requirements due to the long distance between
user equipments (UEs) and remote data centers.
An alternative choice is to exploit the under-utilized
resources of nearby vehicles to alleviate the pressure on
the BS and reduce delay. Particularly, future vehicles are
more likely to be equipped with powerful onboard com-
puters and large-capacity data storage units for the sake
of improving driving safety, convenience, and satisfac-
tion [3]. Hence, the tremendous computation resources
provided by vehicles can be utilized to alleviate network
congestion during the peak time. Moreover, compared
to the BS, vehicles which are more close to pedestrial
UEs can provide line-of-sight links to further reduce the
transmission delay. This novel idea is known as vehicular
fog computing (VFC), which is able to provide more
computing resources and less processing delay.
However, despite the above-mentioned advantages,
the wide area deployment of VFC still confronts the
problem of lack of an effective incentive mechanism
for vehicles to share their resources. Most of previous
studies assume that vehicles will follow the resource
allocation decision and act as fog nodes unconditionally
[4]–[7]. This assumption is too optimistic in practical
implementation. Due to the cost incurred by resource
sharing, self-interested vehicles are reluctant to serve as
fog nodes unless they are well compensated.
In [8], Luong et al. proposed a comprehensive liter-
ature survey of pricing-based incentive mechanisms for
resource allocation in cloud-enabled wireless networks.
Liu et al. provided a Stakckelberg game-based pricing
scheme to stimulate edge server owners to participate in
computation ofﬂoading [9]. As we can observe, most
of current works have assumed that the information
of the potential fog nodes is perfectly known by the
BS. However, the preference of each vehicle towards
the total amount of available resources belongs to the
vehicle’s private information, i.e., the information is
only known by the vehicle itself, which is a typical
paradigm of information asymmetry [10]. Therefore, it is
necessary to design an incentive mechanism, which can
improve the utilization of resources and reduce delay
under information asymmetry.
In this paper, the BS designs a contract to motivate
vehicles to share their resources, which speciﬁes the rela-
tionship between the performance and the reward. In the
contract, each distinct performance-reward association
is deﬁned as a contract item, and a contract generally
contains a great variety of contract items. Then, the BS
broadcasts the contract, and each vehicle chooses its
desired contract item to maximize its payoff.
The remaining chapters of this paper are summarized
as follows. The system model is described in section
II. Section III introduces the incentive mechanism in
VFC and section IV shows the simulation results. The
conclusion is given in section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The VFC resource allocation framework is shown in
Fig. 1. In each cell, there exists a BS, which takes charge
of intra-cell resources coordination, and numerous UEs,
which emerge a great number of tasks. During the peak
time, the BS can employ a group of vehicles to act as
fog nodes and UEs can reduce delay via computation
Fig. 1. The VFC resource allocation framework.
demand ofﬂoading. With a proper incentive mechanism
designed by the BS, each vehicle can actively adjust the
amount of sharing resources according to the reward in
order to maximize its individual payoff.
For the sake of simplicity, we adopt a time-slot
model [11]. The set of vehicles and the set of UEs
within the coverage of the BS remain ﬁxed within
each slot, and vary across different slots. During slot
t, we assume that there exist M vehicles and N
UEs. The set of vehicles and the set of UEs are de-
noted as VM = {V1, · · · , Vm, · · · , VM} and UN =
{U1, · · · , Um, · · · , UM}, respectively. Denote a triplet
{Dn, Cn, τn} as the attributes of each UE, where Dn
represents the task data size, Cn is the required compu-
tation resource for processing the task, and τn represents
the delay constraint.
III. A CONTRACT-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
FOR RESOURCE SHARING
In this section, we propose a contract-based resource
allocation strategy for UEs to employ the shared re-
sources to ofﬂoad their tasks.
A. Vehicle Type Modeling
The preference of a vehicle towards resource sharing
is quantiﬁed as its vehicle type. Due to the different
conﬁguration of each vehicle, the type of vehicles are
generally different. A vehicle with a higher type is more
willing to share its resources and serve as a fog node
compared to a vehicle with a lower type. Thus, it is
intuitive for the BS to employ higher-type vehicles. Since
the number of vehicles in a cell is usually limited, the
set of vehicle types is assumed as a discrete and ﬁnite
space. Vehicle type is deﬁned as
Deﬁnition 1: (Vehicle Type): Considering the set of
vehicles VM , these M vehicles can be sorted in an
ascending order based on their preferences and classi-
ﬁed into M types. Denote the set of vehicle types as
Θ = {θ1, · · · , θm, · · · , θM}, which is given by
θ1 < · · · < θm < · · · < θM ,m = 1, · · · ,M. (1)
Deﬁnition 1 is also applicable when there are multiple
vehicles belong to the same type. The computational
complexity decreases with the vehicle types, but at the
expense of the effectiveness of resource allocation.
In the scenario of information asymmetry, we assume
that the BS only knows that there are a total of M types
of vehicles and each vehicle Vm ∈ VM belongs to type
θm with a probability λm, i.e.,
∑M
m=1 λm = 1.
B. Contract Formulation
In this paper, the BS can design up to M con-
tract items for vehicles with M types. The contract
items describe the employment relationships between
the employer, i.e., the BS, who designs a series of
incentive contract items, and the employees, i.e., the
vehicles, who receive rewards by providing idle re-
sources. For instance, the contract item dedicated for
type θm vehicle is denoted as (δm, πm), where δm
denotes the required computation resources, and πm
is the corresponding reward. The whole contract is
denoted as C = {(δm, πm), ∀m ∈ M}, where M =
{1, · · · ,m, · · · ,M}.
Assuming the total amount of computation tasks that
can be processed by the BS during a time interval T
is CBS , we have CBS = δBST . Here, δBS is the
unit computation capability of the BS per second. With
the assistance from vehicles, the computation capability
of the BS can be enlarged and the corresponding task
processing delay can be reduced. We model the beneﬁt
of the BS as a linear function of the reduced delay. By
signing the contract item (δm, πm) with type θm vehicle,












where rBS is the unit beneﬁt brought by the reduced
delay.
With the M types of vehicles, the expected utility of





The utility function of type θm vehicle which accepts
the contract item (δm, πm) is given by
UVm(δm, πm) = θmπm − δm. (4)
The objective of the BS is to optimize its utility
under the scenario of asymmetric information via the
adjustment of each contract item. The corresponding




s.t. C1 : θmπm − δm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ M,
C2 : θmπm − δm ≥ θmπm′ − δm′ , ∀m,m′ ∈ M,
C3 : 0 ≤ δ1 < · · · < δm < · · · < δM , ∀m ∈ M,
C4 : δm ≤ θm, ∀m ∈ M. (5)
where C1, C2, and C3 represent the IR, IC, and mono-
tonicity constraints, respectively. C4 represents the upper
bound of δm.
Deﬁnition 2: The IR, IC, and monotonicity constraints
are deﬁned as follows:
• Individual rationality (IR) constraint: Type θm
vehicle, ∀m ∈ M, will get a nonnegative payoff if
it selects the contract item (δm, πm).
• Incentive compatibility (IC) constraint: The IC
constraint ensures that type θm vehicle, ∀m ∈ M,
will get the maximum payoff if and only if it selects
the contract item (δm, πm) designed for its own
type.
• Monotonicity constraint: The reward of type θm
vehicle, ∀m ∈ M, should be higher than that of
type θm−1 vehicle, and lower than that of type
θm+1 vehicle.
Based on the IR, IC, and monotonicity constraints, we
conclude that for any m,m′ ∈ M, if θm > θm′ , then
δm > δm′ and πm > πm′ . πm = πm′ and δm = δm′ if
and only if θm = θm′ .
C. Optimal Contract Design under Information Asym-
metry
The corresponding optimization problem P1 involves
M IR constraints and M(M − 1) IC constraints. To
provide a tractable solution, the following procedures are
carried out to simplify the problem.
Step 1: IR Constraints Elimination
For type θm vehicle, m ∈ M,m = 1, we can derive
UVm ≥ UVm−1 ≥ UV1 ≥ 0. (6)
The IR constraints of θm vehicle holds automatically as
long as the IR constraint of type θ1 vehicle is guaranteed.
Step 2: IC Constraints Elimination
We deﬁne the IC constraints between type θm and
type θm′ , m′ ∈ {1, · · · ,m− 1}, as downward incentive
constraints (DICs). Similarly, the IC constraints between
type θm and type θm′′ , m′′ ∈ {m+ 1, · · · ,M}, are
deﬁned as upward incentive constraints (UICs). In the
following, we show that both the DICs and UICs can be
reduced.
We consider three adjacent vehicle types, i.e., θm−1 <
θm < θm+1, which satisfy
θm+1πm+1 − δm+1 ≥ θm+1πm − δm, (7)
θmπm − δm ≥ θmπm−1 − δm−1. (8)
where (7) denotes the DIC between type θm+1 and type
θm, and (8) denotes the DIC between type θm and θm−1.
By combining πm+1 ≥ πm ≥ πm−1, we have
θm+1πm+1 − δm+1 ≥ θm+1πm−1 − δm−1. (9)
Therefore, if the DIC between type θm+1 and θm holds,
then the DIC between θm+1 and θm−1 also holds. The
DIC constraints can be extended downward from type
θm−1 to type θ1, which are given by
θm+1πm+1 − δm+1 ≥ θm+1πm−1 − δm−1,
≥ · · ·
≥ θm+1π1 − δ1.
(10)
Thus, we demonstrate that if the DICs between ad-
jacent types hold, then all the DICs hold automatically.
Similarly, we can demonstrate that if the UICs between
adjacent types hold, then all the UICs hold automatically.
Based on the above analysis, the M IR constraints
and M(M − 1) IC constraints can be reduced to 1 and
M − 1, respectively. Furthermore, in order to maximize
the utility of the base station, the optimal contract item









1 − δ∗1 = 0. (11)
The optimal contract item for any type θm vehicle
(δ∗m, π
∗






m − π∗m−1),m = 2, · · · ,M. (12)




s.t. C1 : θ1π1 − δ1 = 0,
C2 : δm = δm−1 + θm(πm − πm−1), 2 ≤ m ≤ M,
C3, C4, ∀m ∈ M. (13)
We can easily prove that P2 is a convex program-
ming problem by checking the Hessian matrix, which
can be solved by applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. The Lagrangian associated with P2 is given
by
L({δm}, {πm}, {μm}, {ρm}, {βm})
















where μ1 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to
constraint C1. {μm,m = 2, · · · ,M}, {ρm}, and {βm}




Number of vehicles 5− 20
Number of UEs 15− 25
Radius of BS coverage 1000 m
VFC communication radius 200 m
Data size of UE’s task 100− 200 Mb
Computing resources of BS 5 GHz
Transmission power of UEs 30 dBm
Noise power −114 dBm
Bandwidth of UEs 20 MHz
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Fig. 2. The utility of vehicle versus the different type of vehicles.
constraints C2, C3, and C4, respectively. KKT conditions
are summarized as follows:
• Primal constraints: 0 ≤ δ∗1 ; δ∗m−1 ≤ δ∗m, ∀m ∈
M,m = 1; δ∗1 = θ1π∗1 ; δ∗m = δ∗m−1 + θm(π∗m −
π∗m−1), ∀m ∈ M,m = 1; δ∗m ≤ θm, ∀m ∈ M;
• Dual constraints: μ∗m ≥ 0, ρ∗m ≥ 0 and β∗m ≥
0, ∀m ∈ M;
• Complementary slackness: ρ∗1δ
∗





δ∗m−1) = 0, ∀m ∈ M,m = 1; β∗m(δ∗m − θm) =
0, ∀m ∈ M ;









− μm + μm+1 + ρm − ρm+1






− μM + ρM + βM = 0,
∂L
∂πm
=− λm + μmθm − μm+1θm+1 = 0,
∀m ∈ M,m = M,
∂L
∂πM
=− λM + μMθM = 0.
(15)
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Fig. 3. The utility of BS versus the number of vehicles.
IV. SIMULATION
In the paper, we have proposed a contract-based
resource allocation strategy in VFC networks for low-
latency. To verify whether the proposed algorithm can
effectively deal with the resources allocation under infor-
mation asymmetric and reduce delay, a series of numer-
ical results are conducted in this section. Assuming that
the possibility of type θm obeys Gaussian distribution,
and the simulation parameters are presented in Table I.
Fig. 2 shows the utilities of type-4, type-9 and type-
14 vehicles when selecting all the types of contract
items provided by the BS, which illustrates that the de-
signed contract is incentive compatible. Each vehicle can
achieve the maximum utility if and only if it selects the
contract speciﬁcally designed for its type. Additionally, it
is observed that the vehicles with higher types are able
to obtain higher utilities compared to the lower types,
that is the BS offers rewards to the vehicles according
to their contributions.
Fig. 3 shows the utility of BS versus the vehicle
type. It can be observed that the asymmetric information
actually protects the vehicles from being overexploited
by the base station. With complete information, the base
station is able to design a contract such that its utility is
much larger compared to the utility achieved under the
information asymmetry scenario. The performance gap
increases monotonically with the vehicle type.Therefore,
information asymmetry is actually beneﬁcial to the vehi-
cles because the base station cannot overexploit a vehicle
without knowing the complete information of its type.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the contract-based mechanism is pro-
posed to address the resource allocation problem in
the traditional cellular network. To encourage available
vehicles to participate in resource allocation, the contract
theory is used to determine which vehicles are selected as
infrastructures to provide idle resources and how much
of the payoff on them. The simulation results shows that
the proposed mechanism can greatly facilitate the partici-
pation of vehicles in resource allocation and reduce delay
after ofﬂoading tasks to appropriate vehicles. In future
works, we will study how to combine resource allocation
and task assignment in more complicated scenarios.
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